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Abstract 
This paper examines how parties organize legislative speech. Electoral incentives and legislative 
institutions affect speech participation. When electoral systems create personal vote-seeking 
incentives, parties are less concerned with screening speeches and more supportive of members 
seeking to garner name recognition. But in many countries legislative rules and norms constrain 
opportunities for individual position taking during the lawmaking debates. We argue that parties 
resolve this dilemma by organizing speech participation into nonlegislative speeches and 
lawmaking debates. In each instance, different types of legislators are more likely to speak. We 
examine the case of Chile and test the implications of our theory with data on congressional 
speeches. 
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Introduction 
Parties face a perennial challenge—how can leaders exercise sufficient control over their 
members in Congress to build and maintain the party’s ideological identity, while still providing 
legislators with opportunities to establish a connection with constituents? On the one hand, if 
parties give backbenchers free reign, these backbenchers may express positions at odds with the 
party line, muddying the ideological waters and doing harm to the party’s image. On the other 
hand, backbenchers likely bolster their reelection chances by developing a unique political 
identity and honing their constituency connection. Moreover, parties clearly benefit when their 
members are good at attracting votes.  
This tension between establishing party loyalty and allowing for some dissent exists in 
democracies across Latin America (Carey 2007, 2009), as well as in the United States (e.g., Cox 
and McCubbins 1993; Lindstadt and Vander Wielen 2011), Europe (e.g., Hix 2002; Lindstädt, 
Slapin, and Vander Wielen 2011; Proksch and Slapin 2012) and elsewhere (Kam 2009). 
However, the nature and extent of the tension between partisan control and legislator freedom 
varies with electoral incentives and institutions (e.g., Carey and Shugart 1995; Chang and 
Golden 2007). Typically, scholars explore the manifestation of these tensions by examining 
levels of party unity on roll-call votes (Carey 2009; Morgenstern 2004). But roll-call votes can 
only tell part of the story. They are subject to selection effects (Carrubba, Gabel, and Hug 2008) 
and a very high degree of partisan control (Depauw and Martin 2009). Recently, scholars have 
turned to other sources of data to examine the effects of electoral incentives on intraparty dissent 
and representation, including bill cosponsorship (Alemán and Calvo 2013; Crisp, Kanthak, and 
Leijonhufvud 2004; Kirkland 2012) press releases (Grimmer 2013), and legislative debate 
participation (Proksch and Slapin 2012, 2015).  
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In this paper, we present new data on legislative debate in Chile, which we use to explain 
how parties organize the legislative agenda to provide individuals with an opportunity to connect 
with constituents, while still maintaining a coherent party message. Parties in Chile have set 
aside time at the end of most legislative sessions for speeches unrelated to bills—the Hora de 
Incidentes or Incidents Hour—during which members can give speeches that may help them 
establish an electoral connection with their constituents. While the parliamentary rules of 
procedure allow parties to strictly control access to the floor at this time, we find that parties do 
not prevent their members from speaking. Instead, they create opportunities for their more 
rebellious and marginal members to use nonideological speeches to connect with voters. 
Moreover, we find that members who use this opportunity tend to fare better at the polls.  
Rules differ for debates on bills during the Orden del Dia, or Order of the Day. During 
these debates, the rules give all members the right to speak. But rather than equal participation 
among all members, we find that more experienced legislators, those with more influential 
committee positions, and those from the governing parties participate more often in lawmaking 
debates. The results suggest that parties use both formal rules and informal norms (albeit in 
unexpected ways) to control which of their members gain access to the floor at different times. 
Formal rules during the Hora de Incidentes ensure that parties can get floor time for members 
seeking to bolster their individual legislative profile among constituents. And while technically 
parties cannot control who speaks during the Orden del Dia, they appear to have developed 
norms that result in experienced, senior members taking the floor at this time. 
Our findings contribute to a growing literature on legislative behavior in the US Congress 
(e.g., Grimmer 2013), European parliamentary democracies (Martin and Vanberg 2008; Proksch 
and Slapin 2012), and Latin American presidential systems (Crisp and Desposato 2004; Crisp, 
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Kanthak, and Leijonhufvud 2004; Taylor-Robinson and David 2002) that seeks to move beyond 
the use of roll-call data to understand legislative behavior, intraparty politics and dissent, as well 
as modes of political representation. Moreover, we offer one of the first empirical analyses of 
legislative debate participation in Latin American legislatures.1 
Our paper proceeds as follows: we first present the literature on personal vote-seeking, 
intraparty dissent, and parliamentary speech; we then move on to describe the case of Chile and 
offer hypotheses regarding the allocation of floor time to Chilean legislators; finally, we describe 
our data and offer our findings. In short, we argue that Chilean parties balance the competing 
pressures of maintaining party discipline while allowing backbenchers time to address 
constituents’ concerns by carving out a specific time in the legislative session for addressing 
constituent matters—the Hora de Incidentes. During this time, we find that legislators who are 
more likely to dissent from the party on roll call votes and who represent districts further from 
the capital are more likely to take the floor. These are precisely the members who are most likely 
to benefit from and to seek greater name recognition among constituents. Finally, we show that 
members who participate in the Hora de Incidentes are more likely to be reelected. Thus, the 
Hora de Incidentes in Chile plays a similar role to parliamentary question time in countries such 
as the United Kingdom or Ireland where MPs often use questions to raise constituency concerns. 
During debates on bills, however, it is more senior members and members of key committees 
who speak more.  
 
 
																																								 																				
1 One exception is an article by Taylor-Robinson and David (2002) on the Honduran Congress, 
but their focus is not on explaining how parties resolve conflicting incentives through 
organization or on comparing differences within different parts of the session. 
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Electoral Incentives and Legislative Debate Participation 
When political scientists seek to understand how members elected to legislatures 
represent their constituents while serving in the chamber, they most frequently turn to data on 
roll-call votes. Typically they take roll-call behavior as an indicator of ideology (e.g., Clinton, 
Jackman, and Rivers 2004; Poole 2005; Poole and Rosenthal 1997) and may compare it to 
preferences among constituents (e.g., Masket and Noel 2012). However, roll-call data are far 
from a perfect measure of legislator ideology. Because votes are ultimately the means by which 
consequential policy decisions are made, they are often subject to a high degree of partisan 
influence. Parties attempt to keep votes off the floor that may split the party, and some parties 
and actors (e.g., the president in the case of most Latin American democracies or the majority 
party in the US Congress) have significant control over what bills come up for a vote on the 
floor, while others have less influence (e.g., minority parties). Thus roll-call votes are subject to 
selection effects in ways that other forms of data are not (Carrubba, Gabel, and Hug 2008). In 
particular, they may mask intraparty dissent that simmers below the surface—sufficient to be of 
concern to the party, but insufficient to manifest on roll calls. Moreover, they are a blunt and 
imperfect tool for members to signal positions to their constituents. 
Influencing policy via votes, though, is only one way that members of a legislature can 
connect with constituents. Indeed, legislators often pursue several different means of connecting 
with voters, including bringing “pork” back to the district (Cox and Thies 1998; Samuels 2001), 
providing constituency service (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Crisp and Desposato 2004), 
standing up for constituents in parliament during debates and questions (Martin 2011; Proksch 
and Slapin 2012), and releasing statements to the press (Grimmer 2013). As scholars have 
become ever more aware of the limitations surrounding the use of roll-call votes when 
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attempting to explore ideology, intraparty dissent, and constituency connections, they have 
begun to explore other forms of data including bill initiation and cosponsorship, press releases, 
media statements, and legislative speech. Each of these can be viewed as a tool at the disposal of 
parties and their members for representing and connecting with their constituents.  
How parties and their members use these tools, though, is likely a function of the 
personal vote-seeking incentives that electoral systems create (Carey and Shugart 1995). Much 
literature suggests that parties seek to create an ideological “brand” that voters can cue off of at 
election time (Downs 1957) and that this “brand” can be treated as public good that parties must 
protect (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). The extent to 
which, and methods by which, parties seek to protect this brand varies with political regime and 
electoral system (Carey and Shugart 1995). Systems that generate little incentive for personal 
vote seeking (e.g., closed list, high district-magnitude proportional representation systems) not 
only lead parties to strictly monitor and control votes, but also to carefully control access to the 
floor and the content of legislative debates. Where electoral incentives mean that legislators must 
cultivate a personal vote (e.g., single-member districts where candidate names appear 
prominently on the ballot, and open-list systems that generate intraparty competition), parties 
may still carefully monitor votes, but they have a greater incentive to provide members with 
floor time (Proksch and Slapin 2012, 2015). During legislative debates, members may stake out a 
position more in line with the position of their constituents than the position offered by the party, 
or they may address concerns only of relevance to their constituency.  
Some acts of constituency representation are more likely than others to harm the image of 
the party. A legislator creating a name for himself as an ideological rebel willing to buck the 
party line on policy could be detrimental to the party. On the contrary, giving speeches regarding 
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the local community projects in one’s district, or the new community health center paid for with 
government money, is less likely to damage the party. Ideally, parties would like to provide 
opportunities for the latter, less detrimental speech, while preventing the former. In many 
parliaments, particular times during the legislative session are well suited to this type of 
legislative constituency service. Legislatures often set time aside specifically for speeches 
unrelated to bills, often through one-minute speeches. These include the US House of 
Representatives and the parliaments and congresses of Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Israel, 
Panama, Puerto Rico, and Uruguay among others. Martin (2011), for example, demonstrates that 
parliamentary questions primarily function as a means of addressing constituency concerns in 
Ireland. As we will demonstrate, a similar division of the legislative agenda occurs in Chile.  
There is also a growing literature about constituency representation in Latin America that 
has paid particular attention to legislative behavior and attitudes. Several authors have examined 
the effects of electoral incentives (Crisp and Ingall 2002; Crisp et al. 2004; Micozzi 2013) and 
gender (Htun, Lacalle, and Micozzi 2013; Schwindt-Bayer 2006) on bill-initiation patterns, while 
others have focused on legislators’ travel patterns (Crisp and Desposato 2004), cosponsorship 
activities (Alemán and Calvo 2013; Crisp, Kanthak, and Leijonhufvud 2004), and opinions vis-à-
vis those of their constituents (Luna and Zechmeister 2005). While less work exists on debates, 
there have been at least two studies on the subject in Latin America. Piscopo (2011), for 
example, discusses the participation of women in debates on health policy in Argentina, while 
Taylor-Robinson and David (2002) examine debate participation in Honduras. The latter study 
focuses on exploring overall rates of participation (rather than differences within a session) and 
finds that lawyers, government legislators, and senior members have a higher rate of 
participation. We add to this literature by specifically examining the challenges parties face in 
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organizing debate as they aim to use it as a tool for constituency representation. Moreover, we 
examine how debate patterns vary at different times in the legislative agenda. 
The next sections focus on speech participation in the Chilean Congress. In Chile, a 
presidential democracy with a long tradition of parliamentary politics, electoral rules make the 
personal traits of individual candidates important to parties and voters. But, as we describe 
below, parties have to accommodate individual demands for district-focused representation while 
maintaining their focus on national policy and presenting a cohesive message. Thus, party 
members must coordinate to both boost their personal reputation and deliver a unified party. This 
dilemma, we argue, is resolved endogenously through norms about the allocation of speech time 
at different moments during the session. 
 
Parties, Institutions, and Legislators’ Incentives in Chile 
In this section, we first describe the partisan and institutional context influencing 
legislators’ behavior, as well as the opportunities they have to attend to district needs. We 
conclude with testable hypotheses about how legislators’ coordinate the allocation of speaking 
time. 
The contemporary Chilean party system is divided into two stable multiparty coalitions 
that have dominated electoral competition over the last 25 years. The center-right coalition is 
composed of two main parties: National Renewal (RN) and Independent Democratic Union 
(UDI). The center-left coalition was composed of four main parties until 2013, the Christian 
Democratic Party (DC), Radical Social-Democratic Party (PRSD), the Party for Democracy 
(PPD), and the Socialist Party (PS).2 Chilean parties are typically considered to be well-
																																								 																				
2 Since 2013, the coalition has included another small party, the Communist Party (PC). 
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institutionalized and organizationally strong (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Party labels are 
important and tend to convey recognizable ideological positions. Roll-call votes reveal unified 
legislative parties and two clearly distinct coalitions (Alemán and Saiegh 2007; Carey 2002; 
Toro Maureira 2007).  
Throughout the post-Pinochet period, legislators in Chile have been elected under rules 
that emphasize individual candidates. In 2015, Congress passed a new electoral system to take 
effect with the 2017 elections, and we discuss the likely implications of the rules’ changes in the 
conclusion. We expect our argument and findings here to remain largely unchanged under the 
new system. The binomial system, as the pre-2017 electoral rules have been called, requires 
voters to pick one candidate from one list. There are two seats available per district, and list 
totals determine how they are allocated among lists. Parties or electoral alliances can present two 
candidates per list in each district, but they can only win both seats if their vote total doubles the 
vote of the list coming second in the district. If this is not the case, the second seat goes to the list 
coming second in the district. Within each list, the individual candidate with the most votes wins 
the seat. This is equal to an open-list proportional representation system with districts of 
magnitude two and a D’Hondt formula. There are 60 districts for elections to the Chamber of 
Deputies and 19 districts for elections to the Senate. Given the relative vote strength of each 
coalition, most districts end up electing one member from each coalition. This means that most 
often the focus of the electoral contest is between the two individual candidates of the same list 
(i.e., coalition), who always belong to different parties.3 Yet, those districts where the top list 
doubles the one coming second tend to determine which coalition controls the chamber. 
																																								 																				
3 In the election of 2013, for example, the winning coalition doubled the vote of the second list in 
10 of the 60 districts. 
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Chilean legislators often build a career in Congress. The country has one of the highest 
rates of reelection in Latin America, with a membership turnover similar to that of European 
parliamentary democracies. Since 1998, first-time members have represented around one-third of 
the membership of the Chamber of Deputies (Botero 2008; Navia 2008). Notwithstanding the 
relevance of individual candidacies in Chilean elections, parties exert a large influence over the 
selection of candidates and electoral campaigns. This is particularly the case in the Chamber of 
Deputies. Legislators who want to run for reelection typically receive the endorsement of their 
parties and compete again in their district. But other candidacies involve complex negotiations 
within parties and among coalition partners. While there are variations across parties in the 
degree to which local actors and members can voice their input, candidate selection is generally 
considered to be centralized in the party leadership (Siavelis 2002).4 At election time, campaigns 
tend to be national in focus, particularly if the congressional election is concurrent with the 
presidential election. 
But local politics and individual candidacies are also of importance to voters, and parties 
work to enhance their candidates’ reputation in the district. Political parties often poll voters to 
gauge the support of potential candidates and rivals in the district and on occasion have used 
these poll numbers to decide on individual candidacies. According to Navia, small district 
magnitude, preelectoral polls, and forceful competition between coalition partners “have forced 
parties to pay more and more attention to the personal characteristics and electability of potential 
Chilean legislative candidates” (2008, 92–93). 
In elite surveys, Chilean legislators often underline their concern for local constituents. 
They usually respond that they primarily represent district voters rather than all voters or the 
																																								 																				
4 While party elites do not fully control the candidate-selection process, they exercise veto power 
over nominations (Navia 2008). 
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party, express allegiance to district voters in conflictive cases, and give significant importance to 
bringing resources into the district (Marenghi 2009; Marenghi and Garcia Montero 2006; Nolte 
2002; Valverde 2009). However, the apparent predilection of Chilean legislators for regional 
interests above partisan interests revealed by elite surveys is not readily obvious in their behavior 
(Siavelis 2009). Chilean legislators do not seem to translate their district-oriented attitudes into 
locally oriented legislation (Marenghi 2009).  
One important reason locally oriented legislative behavior is not readily apparent is 
because political institutions discourage it. Legislators cannot initiate spending bills or introduce 
amendments that increase spending; the executive has exclusive initiation powers over several 
policy areas, omnibus legislation is forbidden, and strict germaneness rules bar both amendments 
and discussion on matters not directly related to the main topic of the bill being debated. These 
rules are enforced by the president of the chamber. While legislators are limited in their ability to 
initiate pork-barrel legislation (Siavelis 1997) and usually behave in a disciplined fashion, on 
occasions they exchange their support on plenary votes for district specific benefits (Toro 
Maureira 2007). 
Parties play an important role in the distribution of congressional offices, including 
positions in the chamber’s directorate and assignments to permanent committees. In the Chamber 
of Deputies, the majority-elected directorate, called Mesa, crafts the daily schedule after 
consultation with the leaders of the legislative party blocs (Jefes de Comités Parlamentarios).  
Sessions of Congress are normally divided into three parts. The first two are dedicated to 
bills and resolutions. As in most national legislatures in democratic countries, the central part of 
the session is allocated to discussing and voting bills (Orden del Día). In Chile, executive bills 
take up a substantial portion of this time. This is mainly the consequence of presidents’ wide 
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urgency power, which forces bills into the agenda after a short period of time, and their 
prerogatives over bill initiation. But legislator initiated bills are also regularly debated. In this 
part of the session, any member has the right to speak for a limited time about the bill being 
debated.  
Following debate and votes on bills, the session moves to address congressional 
declarations and resolutions for 20 minutes. They are typically initiated by multiple authors (up 
to 10) and are automatically put on the calendar.5 They are voted without amendments6 after very 
short statements in favor and against it.7 
The last part of the session is called the Incident Hour (Hora de Incidentes) and is 
dedicated to individual speeches on any matter, except bills. It lasts 60 minutes per session, 
which are allotted to party groups according to their seat share. These speeches can include 
information requests to the bureaucracy (oficios). The Incidents Hour has a long history in the 
Chilean Congress. It was already in place in the late nineteenth century (Obando 2011). In his 
examination of Chilean congressional politics prior to the 1970s, Agor (1971, 133–34) noted that 
legislators often distributed these speeches among district constituents to show how they were 
working for their interests. This is still common. Frequently, legislators request that transcripts of 
their speech be sent to important members of their constituency. Interestingly, parties ensure that 
all MPs who wish to make a speech during the Incident Hour have the opportunity to do so. 
Dockendorff (2016), when conducting interviews with former Chilean party whips and senior 
party officials, finds that parties make time for their members wishing to participate to do so, 
																																								 																				
5 Each item cannot take the plenary more than 10 minutes. 
6 The authors of the resolution can present modifications before the proposal is debated by the 
plenary. 
7 If quorum is not met, they are considered rejected. 
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even if only for a minute. The whips do not restrict access to the floor at this time and the 
leadership does not control what rebels do during the Incident Hour. 
In sum, electoral incentives make the personal traits of individual candidates important to 
Chilean parties, and career-oriented legislators know that they need to appear responsive to the 
demands of district constituents. The lawmaking route, however, is difficult. Political institutions 
constrain opportunities for initiating pork-barrel legislation or adding nongermane amendments, 
electoral competition usually centers around national-level policies, and there are significant 
hurdles to getting locally oriented bills passed. Speech offers another route for legislators to 
appear responsive to their districts. But parties need to resolve how to accommodate individual 
demands for district-focused signals with their focus on national policy and the leaders’ demand 
for a cohesive party message. In the language of organizational theory, they need to adjust to the 
external demands imposed by the electoral context and the internal stress arising from the 
diversity of positions, priorities, and policy goals. 
We believe that parties resolve this dilemma endogenously through norms about the 
allocation of speech time. Seeking to enhance the personal reputation of individual legislators 
while working to convey a unified policy message demands coordination. A division of labor 
where different types of legislators speak at different moments during the session is one such 
mechanism that goal-oriented members can establish. We expect to find such a division in the 
Chilean Chamber of Deputies. More specifically, we hypothesize that legislators more likely to 
be rewarded electorally as a result of strengthening constituency support should be more likely to 
participate during the stage of the session dedicated to nonlawmaking speeches. During bill 
debates, however, legislators should have greater incentives to privilege the party’s policy 
message, which should lead parties – perhaps through informal norms – to prioritize expertise 
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despite rules that provide egalitarian access to debate time. Such prioritizing benefits the party 
brand and has positive implications for the electoral prospects of individual members. 
Legislators tempted to shirk from this norm most often acquiesce because party leaders have the 
means to provide electoral and policy benefits that are valuable to them, as well as the ability to 
impose costs that may affect the fate of their bills, amendments, assignments, and political 
careers. 
In the next section, we describe the data we use to test these hypotheses and our 
operationalization of the different variables. 
 
Congressional Speech Data 
To examine the organization of legislative speech, we collected information on individual 
participation in bill debates (Orden del Día) and the Incidents Hour in the Chilean Chamber of 
Deputies between 2006 and 2010. Data on the number of times each legislator participated 
during the section dedicated to lawmaking debates comes from the chamber’s summary of daily 
sessions. Between 2006 and 2010 there were a total of 3,937 such events. The same summaries 
provide data on whether or not a legislator participated during the Incidents Hour. During the 
same four-year period, there were a total of 1,960 individual participations in the Incidents Hour. 
These individual-level counts of different types of debate participation make up our dependent 
variables.  
Legislators tend to use the Incidents Hour to speak about constituency issues and request 
information from government agencies. Our examination of the content of these speeches reveals 
that most focus on local or regional issues and often address specific institutions or officials 
operating at the local level. Around 62% of the speeches refer to a matter related to a region or a 
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city (including celebrations), address individuals, or demand information from government 
agencies about their activities at the local level, while only 22% refer to national issues.8 
Interventions during the Incidents Hour can include oficios, which are formal requests for 
information from government offices or petitions for the bureaucracy to act in a certain manner. 
For example, at the end of 2006 Deputy Rosauro Martinez took to the floor of the chamber to 
demand the reopening of a government office for consumer protection (Sernac) that had recently 
closed in the city of Chillan.9 Martinez, a third-term legislator and former mayor of the city, 
added an oficio asking the President to instruct his Minister of Economy to work on reopening 
the office. In August of 2007, Deputy Marcelo Díaz expressed his concern about possible 
shortages of anesthesia in public hospitals in Andacollo and Vicuña, two cities in his district.10 
He added an oficio asking the Minister of Health and the director of Coquimbo’s Health Service 
to clarify this matter. In 94% of the individual interventions that took place during the Incident 
Hour between 2006 and 2008, legislators presented oficios. Most of them were remitted to 
executive offices: around 86% went to the national government, with 69% of these addressing at 
least one cabinet member and 11% addressing the President. Next in line were those sent to the 
appointed administrative heads of the country’s regions (about 9%) and to mayors, governors, 
and the city council (about 6%). About half of the oficios had a local (28%) or regional focus 
(21%), with just 22% addressing national issues.11 
																																								 																				
8 Other scholars have also characterized speeches during the Incidents Hour as focused on 
constituency service and district concerns (Agor 1971; Visconti 2011). While speeches are not 
commonly characterized as ideological, they often include criticisms at the functioning of 
government agencies. 
9 Intervention took place on December 19, 2006. 
10 Intervention took place on August 7, 2007. 
11 The rest focus on individuals (14%), sectors (9%), and administrative issues (6%). 
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We hypothesize that legislators more likely to gain electorally as a result of strengthening 
constituency support and garnering name recognition should be more likely to participate during 
the Incidents Hour. We first examine whether those legislators who disagree most with the party 
on policy participate more frequently during the Incidents Hour. These legislators are less likely 
to benefit from the party “label” and thus they may need to rely more on constituency-focused 
legislative activity to boost name recognition and their own “personal vote”. Specifically, we 
examine whether the percentage of times a legislator votes against the majority of the party on 
roll calls during the period of study affects debate participation. Next, we consider whether 
electorally insecure members participate more frequently. We consider both the electoral 
margins within and between lists. Lastly, we examine whether legislators who do not run in the 
subsequent election speak less often. If members know they are likely to retire, they have less 
need to engage in constituency-related personal vote-seeking activities.  
Legislators from remote districts should also be particularly interested in participating in 
the Incidents Hour. It is typically more difficult for their constituents to directly access the 
central government bureaucracy. In addition, the local concerns of remote districts are less likely 
to be highlighted by the national media or influential interest groups. Legislators further from the 
capital should have particular incentives to use the Incidents Hour to call attention to their 
districts’ problems and to make demands to bureaucrats in the metropolitan center. As a result, 
we expect legislators to participate more often the further their districts are from the capital. To 
capture this effect, we include a variable measuring the distance from the legislator’s district to 
Santiago (in logged kilometers). 
We hypothesize that during bill debates (Orden del Día) there should be greater 
incentives to privilege the party’s policy message and members’ expertise. This implies that 
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inexperienced legislators should be less likely to participate and that those with greater policy 
expertise should be more likely to participate. To capture these effects we include variables 
indicating whether legislators are first-time members of congress and whether they were 
assigned to key congressional committees.12 
We also include three control variables. The first, leadership, indicates whether the 
legislator served in the chamber’s directive board (Mesa) or is a leader of a party caucus. The 
second indicates whether the legislator belongs to the government coalition. Studies have found 
that opposition members are more likely to take advantage of the oversight aspects of question 
time in parliamentary countries (Dandoy 2011; Proksch and Slapin 2011; Rasch 2011) and the 
opportunities provided by the one-minute speeches in the US Congress (Maltzman and Sigelman 
1996). Yet others have found that members of the government are generally more likely to speak 
(Taylor-Robinson and David 2002). The third, died, controls for two members who died in office 
midterm. 
 
Results 
As our dependent variables are count data, we present two negative binomial 
regressions.13 In all models, our unit of analysis is the legislator. In the first model, our 
dependent variable is the count of the sessions during which each legislator spoke during the 
																																								 																				
12 We considered as key committees the Finance Committee and the Constitution, Legislation, 
and Justice Committee. 
13 We have also run Poisson models and find nearly identical substantive results. The Poisson 
model, though, assumes that the conditional mean of the dependent variable equals its 
conditional variance. We find evidence of overdispersion, implying the conditional variance is 
greater than the conditional mean. The estimated standard errors of the Poisson model are likely 
biased downward. Indeed, the standard errors in the negative binomial models are substantially 
larger than those in the Poisson models. Nevertheless, we find statistically significant effects in 
the negative binomial models, making us more confident in our results. Additionally, we have 
run models including party fixed effects and the results do not change. 
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Hora de Incidentes.14  The second model captures the number of speeches given during bill 
debates (Orden del Día).15 
Table 1 about here 
 During the Hora de Incidentes, we find that those legislators who dissent from their party 
more often are significantly more likely to give speeches. An increase of 1 in the dissent score 
leads to an increase of 6% in the number of sessions where a speech was given, holding other 
variables constant. In terms of the number of speeches, an increase of one standard deviation 
(i.e., 3.3) in the party dissent score increases by three the number of sessions where a legislator 
gives a speech in the Hora de Incidentes. In addition, legislators who do not run again for a 
position in Congress at the end of their term are significantly less likely to give speeches during 
this part of the legislative sessions. These legislators give 44% fewer speeches than those who 
run again. 
We also find that members from geographically remote districts speak more during the 
Hora de Incidentes. While members from the capital only speak in approximately 9 sessions on 
average, those in the most far-flung districts speak up to 25 times on average. This result 
suggests that members from outlying districts feel a greater need to inform the government about 
what is happening in their districts than those members from the capital or nearby. Or, 
alternatively, they feel a greater need to participate so they can signal to their constituents that 
they are standing up for their interests in the faraway capital.  
The results also show that members of key committees speak significantly less. Such 
members speak in 53% fewer sessions than other legislators, holding other variables constant. 
The fact that members in key committees give fewer speeches suggests that expertise does not 
																																								 																				
14 The average number during the Hora de Incidentes is 16. 
15 The average number during the Orden del Dia is 32. 
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matter much for speeches given during this part of the session. Members of key committees tend 
to have sufficient exposure at other times besides the Hora de Incidentes. In addition, the 
coefficient for leadership suggests that such members speak less, but does not achieve statistical 
significance. Lastly, contrary to our expectations, the results of model 1 fail to find a statistically 
significant effect of the electoral marginality variables.  
The results from model 2 highlight just how differently parties use floor time during the 
Orden del Dia compared with the Hora de Incidentes. Here, there is no statistically significant 
(or substantively important) impact of party dissent on speech participation. Geographical 
distance also does not matter as it is does during the Hora de Incidentes. Instead, members of 
key committees participate more, while those members new to congress participate less. 
Members serving on a key committee are expected to participate in 44% more sessions than 
others. Likewise, members in their first term are expected to speak in approximately 29% fewer 
sessions than longer-serving members. Lastly, the results show that members of the governing 
parties are significantly more likely to participate in this part of the congressional session than 
others. A legislator from a governing party is 39% more likely to give a speech during the Orden 
del Día than a legislator from other parties. These results suggest that parties orchestrate floor 
appearances during bill debates to favor longer-serving members with greater policy expertise. 
Parties are unlikely harmed when freshmen outsiders give nonpolicy speeches, but when the 
policy content of bills is being discussed during the Orden del Dia, veteran members with policy 
expertise are more likely to take the floor.  
Figure 1 about here 
To demonstrate the significant differences in how parties organize participation during 
the Hora de Incidentes and Orden del Dia we plot the effects of one of our key variables, dissent, 
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during both types of debate. We use first differences; perhaps the most common tool for 
demonstrating substantive effects for generalized linear models (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 
2000). Specifically, we examine the expected difference in speech participation when varying the 
level of dissent. Figure 1 presents two density plots, the top plot based on model 1 and the 
bottom on model 2. We plot the density of 5000 simulated differences in the number of expected 
speeches given by a hypothetical member who dissented on 20% of votes compared with a 
member who dissented on 1.3% of votes.16 The top panel of Figure 1 shows that, during the 
Hora de Incidentes, a member who dissents on 20% of votes is expected to speak in 
approximately 25 more sessions than a member who dissents on 1.3% of votes (demarcated by 
the thick dashed line). The 90% confidence interval (shown by the thin dashed lines) ranges from 
approximately two additional sessions up to 69 additional sessions. The bottom panel displays 
the same first differences for participation during the Orden del Dia. Those members who 
dissent the most are no more likely to participate than those who do not. The expected effect is 
approximately 1.5 fewer sessions.   
These results demonstrate the differences between speech participation in a nonlegislative 
setting and lawmaking debates. Our description of speech participation during the Hora de 
Incidentes underlines how electorally motivated legislators utilize this forum to address 
constituent concerns. We now ask whether participation provides deputies with some electoral 
return. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these speeches can play such a role. As mentioned 
above, regional newspapers frequently report on local matters highlighted by deputies during the 
Hora de Incidentes, and in doing so help to paint a picture of member concerned with 
																																								 																				
16 Simulated for members who are not members of key committees, leaders, or serving in their 
first term, did not die in office, and run again for congress. All other variables are held at their 
mean. Simulations were run using Zelig: Everyone’s Statistical Software (Choirat et al 2016; 
Imai, King, and Lau 2008). 
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representing local interests. Legislators themselves frequently report about their speeches in their 
individual webpages. To more systematically evaluate whether such participation has an 
electoral payoff, we run a regression where the dependent variable is a dummy capturing 
whether a deputy was reelected either to the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate. Our key 
independent variable is speech participation in the Hora de Incidentes and we control for all the 
variables in Table 1 except those capturing whether a member ran again in the next election (we 
drop the two members who died during the term). Results appear in Table 2. 
Table 2 About Here 
The variable capturing speech participation during the Hora de Incidents is positive and 
statistically significant. Delivering these constituency oriented speeches is strongly associated 
with ones chances of returning to the chamber. The model also suggests that those members who 
are more distant from their party and who won by a smaller intra-party list margin in the 
previous election are less likely to be re-elected. Simulations of first differences reveal that 
moving from the first quartile to the third quartile of members with respect to Hora de Incidentes 
participation increases the probability of re-election by approximately 20%. This is a very large 
effect. Of course, it would be unwise to assume a causal relationship. Rather, we believe that 
members who participate more during this part of the parliamentary day are likely those who are 
best at connecting with their constituents more generally, and they are rewarded for their 
constituency service. While explaining the political careers of individual deputies and their 
electoral success is not the focus of this paper, this preliminary evidence supports the notion that 
participation in the Hora de Incidentes provides some nontrivial electoral payoffs.  
The empirical evidence suggests that parties carefully orchestrate the floor appearances 
of their members. Members, often dissidents, who need to demonstrate a pattern parliamentary 
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activity, and stand up for their constituents may do so, but they are much more likely to do so on 
non-policy debates than on those directly related to policy. Indeed, parties set aside a specific 
time during the parliamentary day for this purpose—the Hora de Incidentes. Interestingly, where 
formal rules exist to give parties control over floor time (e.g., the Hora de Incidentes), they use 
these rules to ensure that those members needing exposure get it. When members are technically 
guaranteed a right to speak during debates on bills, the evidence suggests that parties exert 
control, perhaps through informal norms, to ensure that more senior members in key roles have 
access to the floor. 
 
Conclusion 
Recent work in the field of legislative politics has gone beyond roll-call vote analysis to 
examine other sources of information useful for understanding how parties control their members 
in the legislature. Specifically, legislative scholars have become increasing interested in 
examining how parties balance the competing demands of offering members floor time while 
protecting the party message. Data on legislative debates offer new insights into how parties 
orchestrate the behavior of their members in the legislature and how members seek to connect 
with and represent their constituents. These new sources of data have received significant 
attention in the study of the US Congress and have recently been employed to understand 
intraparty politics in European democracies. But less work in this vein has been done in Latin 
American legislatures.  
 We have sought to fill this gap by offering new data on speechmaking in the National 
Congress of Chile. As we have discussed throughout the article, Chile combines electoral rules 
that make the personal vote relevant for career-oriented legislators with strong centralized 
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political parties that care about delivering a common message. It is also a country with highly 
institutionalized parliamentary politics with rules on legislative speech that we can trace back to 
at least the late nineteenth century. We demonstrate that parties and their members have an 
incentive to orchestrate their speeches in such a way that members can connect with constituents, 
but parties can still police their policy message. They have done so by carving out a time for 
debate—the Hora de Incidentes—in which parties can allow members who need to connect with 
constituents the opportunity to stand up for their districts’ concerns on the floor, without sullying 
the party message on policy. Different members are likely to receive more floor time when 
discussing government and other bills during the Orden del Dia.  
As mentioned earlier, a new electoral rule will govern the next elections in 2017. The 
new rule remains open list proportional representation, but it increases district magnitude and the 
number of legislators, while reducing and the number of districts. The number of deputies will 
go from 120 to 155, and the number of senators from 38 to 50.  The number of districts will 
shrink from 60 to 28 in the Chamber of Deputies, and from 19 to 15 in the Senate. District 
magnitude will vary from 3 to 8 for the Chamber of Deputies, and from 2 to 5 for the Senate. 
Two aspects of the electoral reform have the potential to impact legislators’ motivations for 
participating in the hora de incidentes. First, a larger district magnitude should increase the 
incentives to cultivate a personal vote, thereby enhancing the value of the type of speeches 
delivered during this part of the legislative session. As Carey and Shugart (1995) argued in their 
seminal article on the subject, increasing district magnitude in open list proportional 
representation systems should make a legislators’ personal reputation more important for 
electoral success. Second, the reform increased the number of representatives from the regions at 
the expense of those from the metropolitan area. Our empirical analysis demonstrated that 
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distance from the capital increases the likelihood that a deputy delivers a speech in the Hora de 
Incidentes. In short, the reform not only increased the number of deputies, but also made them 
more likely to care about their personal linkage with district constituents. We expect these 
changes to make participation in the Hora de Incidentes even more valuable for Chilean 
legislators. 
In sum, the findings not only extend recent findings from the United States and Europe to 
Latin America, but also highlight the need to carefully examine how speechmaking (and other 
acts of constituency representation) varies within one legislature. Future research should examine 
legislative behavior in Chile going forward under the new rules and in other Latin American 
countries with similar institutions such as Costa Rica, Panama, and Uruguay. 
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Table 1. Negative Binomial Model of Speech Participation 
 
Hora de 
Incidentes Orden del Dia 
  No. of Sessions 
No. of 
Sessions 
Party Dissent Score 0.055** -0.003 
 
(0.027) (0.022) 
Distance from Capital 
(logged) 0.148*** 0.022 
 
(0.046) (0.033) 
Member of Key Committee -0.759*** 0.393*** 
 
(0.216) (0.147) 
Leadership -0.165 -0.183 
 
(0.212) (0.150) 
Not Run Again -0.573** -0.297 
 
(0.288) (0.210) 
Intra-List Margin 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.007) (0.004) 
Margin List -0.006 -0.003 
 
(0.006) (0.004) 
First Term in Office 0.02 -0.351** 
 
(0.21) (0.148) 
Member of Gov. Coalition 0.188 0.333** 
 
(0.233) (0.16) 
Died in office -1.481** -0.685 
 
(0.748) (0.465) 
Intercept 1.811*** 3.306*** 
  (0.334) (0.247) 
N 112 112 
Log Likelihood -409.699 -480.004 
Note: statistical signficance levels in two-tailed test p < 0.1, **  
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors reported in parantheses.  
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Table 2. Logit Model of Re-election 
  Reelection  
Hora de Incidentes 0.051** 
 
(0.023) 
Party Dissent Score -0.211** 
 
(0.097) 
Distance from Capital (logged) 0.073 
 
(0.131) 
Member of Key Committee -0.021 
 
(0.572) 
Leadership -0.723 
 
(0.576) 
Intra-List Margin 0.049** 
 
(0.020) 
Margin List -0.005 
 
(0.017) 
First Term in Office 0.505 
 
(0.561) 
Member of Gov. Coalition 0.657 
 
(0.663) 
Intercept -0.188 
  (0.846) 
N 110 
Log Likelihood -55.681 
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Figure 1. The Effect of Dissent on Speech Participation: First Differences 
 
Note: Density plots of first differences in the expected number of speech sessions moving from 
the minimum to the maximum value on dissent (5000 simulations).  
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